NEWS CENTER – Assessing the ongoing US-Iran negotiations and the possibility of military escalation, Research Fellow Parsa Alirezaei said that, “short of a limited or full-scale war, the most likely scenario may be a narrow agreement that prolongs the crisis rather than resolves it.”

 

Forty-nine days have passed since protests erupted in Tehran on 28 December 2025 over the deepening economic crisis, later spreading across multiple provinces and escalating into uprisings in regions including Rojhilat and Luristan. From the early days of the unrest, Iranian authorities targeted demonstrators, reportedly using live ammunition in January. Some sources claim that close to 50,000 protesters have been killed, although such figures remain contested. The government has also launched widespread arrests and detentions, aiming to suppress the protests and prevent further unrest.

 

 

We spoke with Parsa Alirezaei, Research Fellow at the Centre for Comparative Muslim Studies at Simon Fraser University, about the potential scenarios facing Iran, its population and the wider region.

 

Alirezaei argued that discussions about a US “withdrawal” from the region should be treated cautiously. “Analysts often say that the United States shapes the rules-based order in line with its domestic interests and foreign policy objectives,” he said. “But when US officials talk about pivoting to the Western Hemisphere, I am cautious about describing this as a full withdrawal. A genuine retreat from global power status would require dismantling its worldwide military presence. As long as Washington maintains the capacity to project military and economic power into the Middle East, North Africa and West Asia, it will continue to pursue influence there.”

 

 

SHIFTS IN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

 

According to Alirezaei, recent shifts in US Middle East policy have been most visible in Syria. He suggested that regional actors, including Turkey and certain Gulf allies, have played a role in developments affecting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration in north-east Syria. He added that US foreign policy is not always shaped by a single, coherent strategy. “Different groups with different agendas exert influence,” he said. “Pro-Israel circles may push for a more confrontational approach toward Iran, while Gulf lobbying networks also shape regional policy debates.”

 

A RETURN TO 'STATE-CENTRED' ORDER

 

Alirezaei said that Washington is seeking to re-establish a more “state-centred” order in West Asia. “The US appears less willing or able to rely on non-state actors,” he said. “Instead, it seems inclined to engage actors that can consolidate territorial sovereignty. Contacts in Syria with figures such as Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Colani), formerly associated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, may reflect this preference for dealing with structured, state-based authority.”

 

NO COUNTRY WANTS A COLLAPSED IRAN 

 

Turning to the possibility of war, Alirezaei argued that most regional and Western actors prefer a weakened Iran to a collapsed one. “The Gulf states, Turkey, the European Union and the United States share a common concern: none of them wants a completely collapsed Iran,” he said. “A total breakdown could trigger refugee flows and severe regional instability.”

 

He suggested that Israel might view the situation differently, given that it would be less directly affected by refugee movements and could perceive strategic advantages in a reshaped regional balance. For Turkey and Europe, he added, instability in Iran could generate cascading crises, including new migration pressures and security concerns.

 

Alirezaei dismissed expectations of a sweeping agreement between Tehran and Washington. “Short of war, the most plausible outcome is a limited arrangement that freezes the crisis rather than resolving it,” he said. “Iran’s leadership may prefer to outlast both domestic unrest and external pressure.”

 

From the perspective of a Trump administration, he argued, the political calculus would differ. “Trump tends to seek outcomes he can present as a strong deal,” Alirezaei said. “If he can claim, ‘We did not lift sanctions, yet we forced them to lower enrichment,’ that would be framed as a political win. He is known to favour visible foreign policy achievements. So either a narrow deal emerges, or there could be a ‘surgical’ strike followed by a declaration that decisive action has been taken. I do not find the expectation of a comprehensive agreement realistic.”

 

UNCERTAINTY DOMINATES

 

Alirezaei concluded that none of the current scenarios points to a positive near-term outcome. “Iran’s economic situation remains severe, environmental challenges are mounting, and the security-driven approach to foreign policy is likely to continue,” he said. “Security elites do not appear eager to reform the system or open it up in a meaningful way. They believe they can mobilise resources despite sanctions and use time to their advantage.”

 

He likened the situation to a game of brinkmanship. “Iran may calculate that Trump will not sustain focus indefinitely. The US, meanwhile, may be asking how long Iran can withstand maximum pressure and limited strikes. The central question is one of endurance.”

 

For now, he added, uncertainty prevails. “Those who claim to know exactly what will happen are overstating their case. What we have are scenarios and probabilities. In the short term, there is little sign that conditions for ordinary Iranians will improve.”

 

 

MA / Ceylan Şahinli